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COMMENTS
Arbitration: Arbitration in the 21st Century: Where
We've Been, Where We're Going
Introduction
In 1925, the U.S. Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' The
stated purpose of the Act was to create a procedural rule favoring the enforcement
of arbitration agreements in federal courts Now, as we enter the 21st century, the
scope of the FAA is expanding. Through "judicial revisionism," the Supreme Court
has applied the FAA in a myriad of contexts.
As the United States enters its third full century of existence, arbitration has been
increasingly used in a variety of areas. From its beginnings as an internal dispute
resolution mechanism used within various industries, to a common feature of many
commercial contracts, businesspeople and legal professionals have both embraced
and opposed arbitration. In recent years, many more questions arose with the
expanded use of the FAA in various contexts. Both state and federal courts have
broadly interpreted the FAA to govern many areas of contract law beyond
Congress's intent; thus, it is now necessary for Congress to take a new look at the
scope of the FAA.
Imagine that you have entered into a contract to purchase a business. In the
purchase agreement, there is a clause that states that any claim or controversy
arising out of the contract will be sent to arbitration. At the time of the agreement,
this seems reasonable because you do not foresee any real problems with your
takeover. However, in deciding whether to purchase the business, you relied upon.
the financial statements of the outgoing owners. Now, some time later it appears
that these financial statements were altered to reflect a more solvent business than
actually exists. Clearly, you could seek rescission on the basis of fraud and
misrepresentation in the inducement of the contract. You may want to go to court,
but the party with whom you had the purchase agreement will likely seek a court
order compelling arbitration. You may ask yourself how the arbitration agreement
could be valid, since it was a part of a contract that you feel was procured by fraud.
Will the court force arbitration, or will the court decide the validity of the contract
itself?
1. Congress recodified the United States Arbitration Act in 1954, and renamed the Act the "Federal
Arbitration Act" (hereinafter the FAA).
2. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & E. WENDY TRAcHE-HuBEP, ARBrRAMON: CASES AMD MATERIALS
7 (1998).
3. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984).
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In another situation, as a condition of employment with your local securities
dealer, you must become a member of NASDAQ. Embedded in your NASDAQ
application is an agreement to arbitrate any claims arising out of your employment.
After you have worked for several months, you are fired, you think, because of your
race. You want to sue your employer, but, like the party mentioned above, you do
not know whether the court will compel arbitration or decide your claim itself. The
answer to this question is far from clear and will depend upon the jurisdiction in
which you entered into the contract, the type of claim you are seeking, and whether
you bring your claim in state or federal court. While the aforementioned factors
affect virtually any cause of action, courts have given the FAA, and its state
counterparts, a wide range of interpretations.
This comment retraces the evolution of arbitration procedures from their
inception, the legislative history of the FAA, and both federal and state court
interpretations of the scope of the Act. The purpose of this Comment is to trace the
history of arbitration in the United States, as well as look to the future of arbitration
in this country. Part I surveys the history of arbitration procedures from its
beginnings to its current use in the United States. Part H looks at the legislative
history of the FAA. Part HI analyzes the various judicial interpretations of the scope
and application of the FAA. Part IV analyzes the state of the law in Oklahoma
courts. Finally, Part V considers options for revising the FAA.
L The Historical Development of Arbitration
Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party
renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be
heard.4 Commercial arbitration has been used as an alternative to litigation for
centuries In European countries, trade associations and merchant guilds were the
early supporters of arbitration and preferred the process to litigation for a variety
of reasons." Many of these groups felt that arbitration expedited the process of
dispute resolution and that courts were not knowledgeable enough about commercial
practices to render adequate judgments regarding disputes.' Additionally, these
tradesmen preferred arbitration because of the unique remedies provided by the
arbitration tribunals.9 These remedies often involved sanctions that were not
available at common law.'0
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 70 (6th ed. 1991).
5. See Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rv. 931, 960 (1999).
6. See id. at 970.
7. See id. at 971.
8. See id. at 970.





In the United States, commercial arbitration predates the Revolutionary War."
The process was originally used to resolve disputes within a particular industry.'"
U.S. courts were originally hostile to agreements to arbitrate and routinely
invalidated arbitration provisions, invoking the English common law doctrine of
revocability. 3 In Vynior's Case, the House of Lords originated the revocability
doctrine." Lord Coke expressed the view that promises to arbitrate created a
revocable agency relationship with the arbitrator." U.S. courts adopted this
doctrine of revocability from the English common law courts. 6 Additionally, early
courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate because the courts felt that these
agreements were against public policy, as these provisions overstepped the
jurisdiction of the court. 7
In Vynior's Case, the King's Bench enforced a bond to ensure compliance with
the agreement. 8 Thus, the tradesmen who regularly used these bonds to ensure the
performance of agreements effectively utilized this remedy. However, in 1697,
Parliament enacted the Statute of Fines and Penalties, which forbade the use of
penalty bonds as a remedy for breach of contract." The application of the statute
resulted in English courts only awarding nominal damages for breach of arbitration
agreements.' This negative view toward arbitration agreements carried over into
American courts in the 19th century. In 1874, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed
that advance agreements to oust the courts of jurisdiction are illegal and void.2'
This anti-arbitration view continued until the passage of the United States
Arbitration Law (USAL) of 1925.
As a model for the federal legislation,' the drafters of the USAL used the New
York arbitration statute. Early supporters of the USAL maintained that Congress
enacted the legislation based upon its Article 11 power to establish procedures for
the federal courts. The Act provided that agreements to arbitrate are "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
11. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PRocEssEs 199 (1992).
12. See iiL
13. See HUBER & TRACHTE-HUBER, supra note 2, at 7; see also Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5,
at 981.
14. See Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (L.B. 1609).
15. See 1d.
16. See Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5, at 973.
17. HUBER & TRAcrrE-HUBER, supra note 2, at 9.
18. See Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609).
19. See Statute of Fines and Penalties, 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 11 § 8 (1697) (Eng); 12 SIR WILuAM
HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 519-20 (2d prtg. 1966).
20. See Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5, at 974; see also HUBER & TRAcHTE-HUBER, supra note
2, at 8.
21. See Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
22. HUBER & TRAcmrm-HuBER, supra note 2, at 5.
23. See Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5, at 944.
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the revocation of any contract.""4 The modem Federal Arbitration Act is almost
unchanged from its original form.
Many legal scholars and practitioners argue that the FAA was originally intended
to serve as a self-regulation vehicle between consenting parties within an industry."
For example, the FAA has been invoked as the basis to enforce agreements to
arbitrate all transactions. Before looking at the various interpretations the federal
and state courts have given the FAA, it is important to look at the legislative intent
in passing the Act. As a starting point, we will look at the American Bar
Association Committee on Commerce's report on the Act, and the comments of
Julius Cohen, the president of the ABA at the time of the Act's passage and one of
drafters of the original United States Arbitration Law.
II. Overview of the Federal Arbitration Act
A. Scope of the Act
Congress enacted the FAA's precursor, USAL, in 1925. The Committee on
Commerce of the American Bar Association drafted the Act.' With the combined
support of the ABA and business organizations throughout the United States,
Congress passed the Act through unanimous assent by both houses of Congress.
The Act provided that written clauses providing for arbitration of future disputes
contained in any contract relating to maritime transactions or interstate commerce
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on the grounds for which any
contract may be revoked.' The authors of the Act specifically excepted from the
statute contracts for employment of seamen, railroad employees, and other workers
in foreign and interstate commerce.' In addition to the declaration of the validity
of arbitration agreements, the USAL gave federal courts jurisdiction to enforce
agreements. As a matter of procedure, the federal courts were to enter an order
compelling arbitration, provided that no questions existed as to the validity of the
arbitration agreement. If a question arose as to the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate, courts would adjudicate that question first, then decide whether to order
the parties to submit to arbitration."
B. The Legal Justifications of the Act
The authors of the USAL stated that Congress relied upon its Article I power
by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior federal courts,"
More clearly, the authors of the Act explicitly stated that "a Federal statute
providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements does relate solely to
24. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1994).
25. See Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5, at 942.
26. See Committee on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, ABA, The United States Arbitration
Law And Its Application, I I A.B.A. J. 153 (1925) [hereinafter Committee on Commerce].
27. See id; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § I (West 1994).
28. See id
29. See id




procedure of the federal courts."'" The answer to the oft-asked question of how the
Act applies to the states is that the Act is no infiingement upon the right of each
state to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.
Further, the drafters stated that whether or not a contract exists is a question of the
substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made.' Whether or not
an arbitration clause is to be enforced is a question of procedure governed by the
law of the particular jurisdiction. 3 Many commentators, scholars, and practitioners
have stated that Congress enacted the Act on the basis of its power to regulate
commerce.' However, this is not an accurate statement regarding the congressional
powers relied upon in the passage of the Act.
Although many observers have interpreted these statements to mean that
arbitration agreements are to be given summary judicial approval, this view is
inconsistent with the drafters' intent, when considered with the judicial attitude
extended to arbitration agreements.3 At the time of the passage of the Act, many
courts were hostile to arbitration agreements. The authors of the Act noted two
main reasons for the judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements. First, many
judges expressed the view that they felt unable to enforce arbitration agreements,
absent legislative consent. Second, many courts followed precedents, in which
courts traditionally refused to enforce arbitration agreements. 6 The source of this
hostility is that historically many courts felt a real jealousy toward arbitration,
seeing it as a threat to their jurisdiction. This negativity manifested itself in the
form of many courts refusing to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate."
Thus, the Act does not declare the existence of arbitration agreements as a matter
of substantive law.' Instead, it simply declares the policy of recognizing and
enforcing arbitration agreements in federal courts; it does not, however, encroach
upon the province of the individual states. Nowhere do the authors of the Act state
that the FAA was intended to force federal courts to uphold arbitration agreements
under any circumstances. In fact, the drafters stated that arbitration is a remedy
peculiarly suited to the disposition of questions of fact, such as quantity, quality,
time of delivery, etc3 From these statements, one can infer that the authors
intended that questions of law, like fraud in inducement and the constitutionality of
applying the Act, are best left to the courts. Indeed, questions with which arbitrators
have no particular expertise are best left to the determination of judges with a
background of legal experience and established systems of law.'
31. Id.
32. See id. at 155.
33. See id.
34. See id.; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
35. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 26, at 155.
36. See id.
37. See id,
38. See id. at 156.
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C. Objectives of the Act
While the primary objective of the Act was to make arbitration agreements
enforceable in federal courts, the drafters directed the Act at a number of "evils"
that were viewed as barriers to efficient business practice. First, the drafters sought
to eliminate the delay associated with litigation.4! ' In many instances, a party will
be forced to wait several years before his claim is fully adjudicated. Second,
arbitration is far less expensive than the litigation process.'2 Last, the drafters
stated that litigation often results in a decision that is not viewed as just by the
measures of the business world. This is supported by the contention that arbitrators
are able to fashion unique remedies; further, arbitrators are not bound by rigid rules,
which ultimately will affect the disposition of cases.'3
D. Proposed Operation of the Statute
In situations where both parties are willing to arbitrate, the FAA ensures that
there will be no legal interference to arbitration." On the other hand, if a party
simply refuses to submit to the agreed upon arbitration, the FAA provides the other
party a remedy formerly denied him. As stated before, many courts refused to
specifically enforce arbitration agreements, in part due to the fact that in most
common law jurisdictions specific performance was not an attainable remedy, except
in limited circumstances. ' Another possible scenario for which the Act provides
a remedy is a situation where a party refuses to arbitrate because he believes in
good faith that his agreement does not bind him to arbitrate, or the party believes
that the agreement to arbitrate is not applicable to the controversy." One instance
of a "good faith" belief that a contract does not apply would be where a party
alleges that the agreement was induced by fraud. Additionally, an agreement to
arbitrate may not apply to a controversy in which Congress has statutorily created
a right guaranteeing access to the courts. For example, in various discrimination
statutes for which Congress has given individuals the right to bring suit in federal
courts, the Act requires the court to examine the merits of such a claim.' Thus,
it would appear that if a party is alleging fraud in the inducement of a contract
containing an arbitration clause, or where statutory rights are involved, the drafters
of the Act did not intend for these disputes to be decided by arbitrators.
E. Procedure for Enforcement of the FAA
The procedure for enforcing arbitration agreements is simple. A party seeking
enforcement of an arbitration provision makes a motion in the district court. 8 The
41. Committee on Commerce, supra note 26, at 155.
42. See id
43. See id








Act provides that the opposing party be given reasonable notice of this motion. If
the parties agree that the arbitration provision applies, the court will decide the
motion based upon affidavits and exhibits presented to the court. This procedure
eliminates the need for excessive delay in the disposition of disputes.49 After a few
days, the court will enter an order compelling arbitration. If the agreement fails to
provide for the arbitrators, the court will appoint them. Following this procedure,
the arbitration is to proceed without any further interference from the court.'
Within the arbitration itself, the arbitrators are given the power to call witnesses and
to require the production of papers and other exhibits."' Once the arbitrators have
made their decision, the prevailing party seeks to enforce the judgment in the
district court.' The judgment enforcement procedure should take only a few days,
barring opposition by the adverse party.' In the event that the adverse party
opposes the judgment, the Act provides that the court will nevertheless enforce the
judgment, except in a few specific instances. However, under no circumstances does
the Act allow the court to vacate the award upon a technical ground.' In fact, the
drafters expressed that the courts are bound to accept the judgment of the arbitrators
unless "as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced."'
Such instances include corruption, fraud, or misconduct, or situations where the
arbitrators exceed their authority.' The Act also limits grounds for appeal to
modification, vacation, or correcting an award. Thus, in most situations, the Act
mandates that the courts will uphold the validity of an arbitration award.'
Basically, the drafters of the USAL sought to create an adjudication procedure
that is faster, simpler, and less expensive than litigation. The text of the Act and the
statements of the drafters appear to indicate that the Act does provide the procedural
remedy that both Congress and the drafters intended. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has vastly expanded the original purpose of the Act. In some instances, the
Court has extended the scope of the Act to cover situations that the drafters neither
intended nor anticipated. The following cases illustrate the various rationales the
Court has used to justify its application of the Act
II. The Supreme Court's Expanded Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
Originally, the stated purpose of the FAA was to make agreements to arbitrate
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."' However, the Supreme Court, and
many lower federal courts, have overlooked the framers' intent and have created a
49. See it








58. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1994).
2000]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
body of substantive federal law to govern arbitration agreements." How did this
happen? We must look at the development of this body of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in order to answer the question.
A. Arbitrability of Claims Alleging Fraud in the Inducement of Contracts: Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
The problem begins with the creation of the separability or severability doctrine.
Simply stated, this doctrine means that in a contract containing an arbitration clause,
the contract itself, and the agreement to arbitrate are to be considered separate from
each other.' The seminal case advocating the separability doctrine is Robert H.
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc' In order to fully understand the two
different views on the separability doctrine, it is important to closely examine the
first instance in which the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine, Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin.
In Prima Paint, the Court first fashioned its own federal substantive law
regarding arbitrability. The Prima Paint Court held that a federal court may only
consider issues relating to the formation of the agreement to arbitrate.6 Once a
federal court has determined that the making of the actual arbitration clause is not
in issue, the court is instructed to send the matter to the agreed upon .arbitration."
Thus, the Court mandated that even if a party alleged fraud in the inducement of
a contract, the matter will go to arbitration, unless that party alleges fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself.'
In Prima Paint, the plaintiff purchased a paint business from Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Company (F & C). Originally, the contract was for consulting
services to be provided by Prima Paint to F & C. This contract was soon followed
by the execution of a purchase agreement, in which Prima Paint purchased F & C.
The agreement included various provisions, one of which was a covenant not to
compete, which provided that F & C would not compete with Prima Paint for the
duration of the contract. The agreement called for Prima Paint to make regular
payments to F & C over the six-year life of the contract. The parties added a clause
that took into account the possibility of financial problems for Prima Paint. There
was no such provision regarding F & C. Finally, the contract included an arbitration
clause, which purported to cover any claim or controversy arising out of the contract
or the breach thereof.
When the time came for Prima Paint to make its first payment to F & C, Prima
Paint refused to make the scheduled payment. Several days later, Prima Paint made
the payment, but into an escrow account. Prima Paint notified F & C that it had
59. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also
9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1994).
60. See John Douglas Stiner, Arbitration: Shaffer v. Jeffrey, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 243, 247 (1997).
61. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
62. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395.
63. See i at 403.





breached both the consulting and purchase agreements, and further alleged that F
& C misrepresented itself when F & C represented that it was solvent and able to
perform its contractual obligations. Prima Paint sought to rescind the consulting
agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement in the formation of the contract.
At the same time Prima Paint filed the complaint in the district court, it also sought
injunctive relief to enjoin F & C from proceeding with arbitration. F & C responded
with a cross-motion to stay the legal action until completion of the arbitration
proceeding. F & C contended that the question of whether there was fraud in the
inducement of the contract was a question for arbitration, while Prima Paint alleged
that questions of fraud in inducement were for the courts to decide.
The district court granted F & C's motion and held that the broad arbitration
clause covered a charge of fraud in the inducement of a contract. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Prima Paint's appeal, agreeing that a claim of
fraud in the inducement of the contract itself is a question for the arbitrators to
decide.' This holding meant that even in the face of a conflicting state law, the
federal law was controlling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the federal court or an arbitrator is to resolve a claim of fraud in the
inducement of a contract governed by the FAA.27
The Prima Paint Court looked at the different views of the circuit courts to
determine the question of severability.' In earlier proceedings of this case, the
Second Circuit had held that, as a matter of federal law, arbitration clauses are
separable from the contract in which they are embedded.' Further, the Second
Circuit contended that where no claim of fraud is made as to the arbitration clause
itself, the question of the general contract validity is to be determined by the
arbitrator." This is the infamous 'separability' doctrine. Conversely, the First
Circuit has held that the question of severability is a question for state law and
where a state views an arbitration clause as inseparable from the contract itself, the
court must adjudicate a claim of fraud.7 Thus, the Supreme Court faced the task
of resolving inconsistent decisions in the circuit courts.
Having determined that the contract in Prima Paint was a contract involving
commerce, and therefore within the scope of the FAA, the Court next turned its
focus to deciding whether to apply the separability doctrine. The Prima Paint Court
looked to section 4 of the FAA to answer this question and stated that the language
of the statute does not permit a federal court to consider claims of fraud in the
contract generally.' Further, the Court proclaimed that the federal court may only
consider allegations of fraud where those allegations are directed at the arbitration
66. See i. at 400.
67. See id at 396.
68. See id. at 402-03.
69. See id. at 402.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 403 (citing Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F. 2d 915. 923 (1st Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960)).
72. See id. at 404.
2_0001
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clause itself.3 This curious interpretation raises a serious question: How can a
provision of an allegedly fraudulently induced contract be enforced when the
contract as a whole is possibly void altogether? Again, the Court seems to ignore
this question entirely.
Without providing any solid reasoning, the Court simply disposes of Prima Paint
by pointing to the 'unmistakably clear' language of section 4 of the FAA." In his
dissent, Justice Black, rejects the separability doctrine and provides a different
analysis for determining the question posed to the Court. Justice Black, with whom
Justices Stewart and Douglas join, disagreed with the majority for three main
reasons. First, the legislative history of the FAA clearly indicates that Congress
never intended to create a sweeping body of federal substantive law-' Second, the
avowed purpose of the Act was to place arbitration agreements on the same footing
as other contracts, and the majority's reading of the FAA results in arbitration
agreements being placed on stronger grounds than other contracts." Third, the
majority's holding creates a body of federal substantive law that state courts are
required to applyY For these reasons, many commentators and state courts have
adopted Justice Black's view as the correct interpretation and application of the
FAA.
First, the legislative history of the FAA clearly indicates that Congress never
intended to create a body of federal substantive law that the state courts are
compelled to apply. At the time of passing the FAA, Congress assumed that state
and federal law recognized arbitration agreements as valid. The courts would give
damages for the breach of an agreement, but refused to specifically enforce the
agreements. Thus, the FAA was Congress's manifestation of its intent to provide a
party to an arbitration agreement a remedy formerly denied him." Justice Black
pointed out that Mr. Cohen, the author of the original USAL, stated that the FAA
"does not encroach upon the province of the individual states.""
Next, Justice Black stated that the majority's holding places agreements to
arbitrate on stronger footing than other contracts."' The separability rule that the
Court applied to arbitration clauses frustrates the intent of the authors of the FAA.
The separability doctrine allows a party to seek rescission of "tidbits" of a contract,
and not the contract as a whole.' Justice Black stated that parties that seek to
rescind a contract seek rescission of the contract as a whole, not in pieces." Prima
Paint would not have agreed to the covenant not to compete, the consulting
73. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1994).
74. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
75. See id. at 423.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 424.
78. See id. at 423.
79. See i.
80. Id; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 39, at 277.






agreement, or the arbitration clause but for F & C's fraudulent promise that it would
remain solvent. How could any court hold that the arbitration agreement is
separable from the whole contract, when no court would hold that the covenant not
to compete and the consulting agreement were separable? 4 The Court established
the test for determining whether a number of promises constitute one inseparable
contract in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.' The test is whether the parties
assented to all the promises as a single whole, so that there would have been no
bargain if any promise or set of promises were set out.,, "Under this test, all of
Prima Paint's promises were part of one inseparable contract."T
Finally, Justice Black stated that had this identical contract dispute been litigated
in New York courts under its arbitration act, Prima Paint would not be forced to
submit to arbitration if the state rule of nonseparability applies.' Under the
majority's holding, the Act would supply not only a remedy of enforcement, but also
a body of federal doctrines to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement.'
Under the majority's application of the FAA, the failure to make the Act applicable
to state courts would result in forum shopping and an unconstitutional discrimination
that both Erie and Bernhardt were designed to eliminate.'4 These problems would
be greatly reduced if the Act is given its proper scope: the mere enforcement in
federal courts of valid arbitration agreements9 Justice Black further disagreed with
the majority's reading of the language of the FAA.94 By reaching its conclusion,
the majority would leave legal issues of contractual validity to be determined by
arbitrators, who in many cases, are not qualified to make this judgment. 93 Justice
Black argues that both Congress and the framers of the Act never intended
nonlawyers to be given the province to determine legal issues regarding the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements. 4 This is very important in our analysis of the
Court's reading and application of the FAA. For, if the majority relies upon the
drafters' intent in reaching its decision and that intent is inapposite to the clear intent
of these framers, then some other explanation is necessary to resolve this issue.
Justice Black asserted that the contract in Prima Paint is not even governed by
the FAA, contending that Congress intended this Act to have limited application
to contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods9 In the Senate
hearings for the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, nearly all
84. See id. at 424.
85. 315 U.S. 289, 298 (1942).
86. See i.
87. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 424.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 425.
91. See id. Whether the separability doctrine is constitutional as a matter of federal substantive law
after Erie is beyond the scope of this Comment.
92. See id. at 407.
93. See id. at 408.
94. See id.
95. See i&. at 410.
96. See id. at409.
2000]
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who testified before the committee expressed the view that the FAA was designed
to cover agreements between people in different states who bought, sold, produced,
or shipped commodities." Clearly, the consulting agreement in Prima Paint is not
a contract for the interstate sale of commodities. The majority expands the
legislative intent by reading the words "involving commerce" to mean agreements
affecting commerce!' This is an important distinction. As Justice Black points out,
the courts have always made careful inquiry to assure that the meaning of the word
"commerce" will not be expanded or contracted.' In many other statutes in which
Congress purports to exert its powers over commerce, Congress uses the language
"affecting commerce" when defining the scope of an act of legislation. Justice Black
points out that the language of the FAA is clearly an example of limiting language,
designed to ensure that courts will not expand the scope of the act to contracts
outside of the intended scope of the FAA."m Indeed, when Congress wishes to
exert its full power over commerce, it uses the language "affecting commerce" in
legislation.' Thus, the failure of Congress to use this "magic language," coupled
with the legislative history of the FAA, convinces Justice Black that the FAA was
not intended to cover the consulting agreement in Prima Paint."°2
Next, Justice Black looks at the issue of separability." The majority holds that
under section 4 of the FAA, agreements to arbitrate are separable from the main
body of a contract."° Specifically, section 4 states that the court must order
arbitration if it is "satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration is not
in issue."" ° Justice Black disagrees with the majority holding that this language
clearly intended that courts would look at contracts and agreements to arbitrate
separately." 6 In Prima Paint both lower courts recognized that under New York
law, the consulting agreement and the agreement to arbitrate would be considered
inseparable."tm Thus, in holding that the FAA commands that arbitration
agreements and contracts be viewed separately in determining the question of fraud
in inducement, the majority supplants state substantive law with is own federal
substantive law."m
Where does the Court find the authority to do so? The majority's answer is that
the FAA gives the courts the power to fashion a federal rule to make arbitration
97. See id.; see also Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3, 7, 9, 10 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing].
98. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 409-10.
99. Id. See generally Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 5.





105. Id; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 1994).
106. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403.





clauses separate and valid."' What about Erie?"' The majority's adoption of the
severability doctrine in Prima Paint arises from Judge Medina's opinion in Robert
H. Lawrence Co. v Devonshire Fabrics, Inc." ' Justice Black attacks the majority's
reliance on the Lawrence holding. Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts are bound
to apply state substantive law in diversity cases."' However, the Lawrence court
recognized that applying state law would amount to a rejection of the separability
doctrine in those states that viewed arbitration agreements as nonseparable."'
Thus, as Justice Black states, the result of the Lawrence decision, and the
subsequent affirmation of this doctrine in Prima Paint, is that the advocates of the
separability doctrine ignore the clear language of the FAA as well as the federalism
concerns underlying the Erie doctrine."4 To hold that Congress merely intended
the Act to apply to federal courts would result in a very narrow application of the
Act.
Next, Justice Black questions how the majority concludes that Congress conferred
these rights to the courts."' The majority begins and ends this query by stating
that the FAA is based upon Congress's power over commerce."6 Thus, according
to the majority, Congress has given the courts the power to create federal contract
law. This holding is contrary to the stated purpose of the FAA. In fact, the drafters
of the Act, the American Bar Association, proclaimed that the FAA provides a
procedural remedy for the federal courts."7 Further, the framers of the FAA
maintain that the issue of whether a contract exists should be resolved by looking
at the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made."' This
means simply that the framers of the FAA intended questions of contractual validity
to be resolved by looking at state law governing contracts, not substantive law
fashioned by federal judges."'
The state of the federal courts' treatment of arbitration clauses after Prima Paint
is that notwithstanding a state rule to the contrary, a claim of fraud in the
inducement of a contract is for the arbitrators, and not the court." However, the
Supreme Court did not stop the expansion of the FAA. In 1983, the Court decided
Southland Corp. v. Keating.' The Southland Court reversed the California
Supreme Court holding that Congress created a body of federal substantive law that
is applicable in state as well as federal courts."
109. See ia
110. See Erie R.R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
111. 271F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
112. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.




117. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 26, at 155.
118. See id at 154.
119. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 421.
120. See id at 400.
121. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
122. See id. at 2.
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In Southland, the plaintiffs brought individual and class actions against Southland
Corporation alleging fraud, breach of contract, and violation of disclosure
requirements under the California Franchise Investment Law (CFEL)." Southland
moved to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to the contract." The
California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals ruling, holding that the
CFEL renders void any provision that purports to bind a franchisee to waive
compliance with any provision of the CFfLf.' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider, among other things, whether a state law that appears to
conflict with the FAA violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution."
The Southland Court reasoned that the CFIL directly conflicts with the FAA in
that Congress mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements by passing the
FAA.'27 The Court found only two limitations on the scope of the FAA. First, for
the FAA to apply, an arbitration provision must be part of a written maritime
contract or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Second,
such clauses may be revoked upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Further, the Court noted that nothing in the language




The Southland Court reaffirmed its holding in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp., which held that the FAA creates a body of
federal substantive law applicable in state and federal court." Again, the Supreme
Court disregards the clear legislative history of the FAA. The majority looked to
the House Report to find that Congress clearly intended the FAA to apply in state
as well as federal courts; however, the Court ignored the massive amount of
testimony to the contrary. Indeed, as stated supra, the framers intended the FAA to
be a procedural rule for the federal courts."M Thus, again it would appear that the
majority in Southland clearly ignores the intentions of the framers of the FAA.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority in
Southland. Justice Stevens' main point of contention with the majority is that he was
not persuaded that Congress intended the FAA to have such an unyielding
preemptive effect.'35 Section 2 of the FAA provides for certain exceptions in
which an arbitration agreement may be revoked." Justice Stevens argues that
123. See id at 1.
124. See id
125. See id. at 2.
126. See idt; see also U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 1.
127. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
128. See id. at 11.
129. See id.; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1994).
130. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11.
131. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
132. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11; see also Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. at 24.
133. See Southland,"465 U.S. at 11.
134. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 26, at 156.
135. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J. dissenting).




these exceptions leave room for the implementation of substantive state policies that
would be undermined by the blanket enforcement of certain categories of arbitration
clauses.13' He noted that the exercise of state authority in a field traditionally
occupied by state law will not be deemed preempted absent the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.' Further, Justice Stevens noted that even where a federal
law preempts state policy, this preemption supplants these state policies only so far
as necessary."' There is no language in the FAA that would lead the Court to
believe that Congress intended the FAA to preempt state substantive law.
As we have seen, the framers of the FAA never intended the Act to be anything
more than a procedural rule for the federal courts. The result is that the Supreme
Court has determined that arbitration clauses that would likely be deemed invalid
under state law will be valid in order for the courts to encourage arbitration. But,
the result is that parties are bound to an arbitration clause even though these parties
allege that the entire contract was procured by fraud.
In her dissent from the Southland majority, Justice O'Connor vigorously disagrees
with the majority's holding. She emphasized two points of contention: the incorrect
interpretation of the FAA, and the Court's mandate that state courts apply the FAA
principles in the same manner in which a federal court would apply them. She
states that the Court utterly fails to recognize the clear congressional intent
underlying the FAA." Justice O'Connor opined, based upon her reading of the
legislative history of the FAA, that Congress intended to require federal, not state,
courts to respect arbitration agreements.' Her interpretation of the legislative
history of the FAA raises similar points to those raised by Justice Black in his
dissent in Prima Paint, and to Justice Stevens' dissent in Southland. Most notably,
Justice O'Connor points out that both the drafters of the Act and the early
commentators all "flatly stated the Act was intended to affect only federal court
proceedings."'4
Next, Justice O'Connor states that the scope of the FAA can be recognized by the
powers Congress relied on in passing the Act. The majority states that Congress
passed the FAA relying upon its power to govern interstate commerce. 43
However, the dissent points to numerous statements by the drafters of the bill that
the FAA was intended only to be a procedural rule in federal courts."" The
majority opinion cites an excerpt from the House Report to support its holding.' 5
However, as Justice O'Connor notes, this is the only sentence in the entire report
upon which the majority could rely to support its reading of the FAA's legislative
137. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 18.
138. See id; see also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
139. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 18; see also PAUL M. BATOR Er AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTmi 470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
140. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 22-23.
141. See id. at 23.
142. Id. at 26; see also Hearing, supra note 97, at 39-40.
143. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 28.
144. See id
145. See id. at 13; see also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
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history."4 Additionally, the majority's decision in Southland ignores the clear
holding of Erie.'47 Erie denied the federal government the power to create
substantive law to be applied in diversity cases.
Justice O'Connor noted that in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,' 8 the Court held
that the duty to arbitrate a contract dispute is outcome-determinative. 4 ' Thus,
applying the Erie doctrine to the arbitration context, enforcement of arbitration
clauses is a matter normally governed by state law in federal diversity cases, and
the FAA should be read with these limitations in mind.
Next, Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Prima Paint, the Court limited its
holding to say only that the FAA could be constitutionally applied in diversity
cases." The FAA covers only contracts involving interstate commerce, and
Congress clearly has the authority to legislate in that area.' The Court was
careful, however, not to hold that the FAA's substantive policies were to be applied
to all contracts within its scope, whether sued in state or federal court." Until
Southland, the Supreme Court had never had the opportunity to decide the
applicability of the FAA in state courts. In fact, both Prima Paint and Cone
involved federal litigation." Thus, it appears that the majority's holding in
Southland is not supported by either legislative intent, or judicial precedent. As
Justice O'Connor painstakingly explains, there is simply no reason for the Court to
read the FAA to create a federal right to be enforced in both state and federal
forums. Nothing in the language of the FAA should lead the Court to its
decision.'" The decision of the majority gives the FAA a far broader reach than
Congress intended.'"
The question arises: why would the majority proclaim that state courts must apply
the FAA in their proceedings? The Southland Court states that applying the FAA in
federal, and not state, courts would allow parties to choose their own applicable law
through forum shopping. Justice O'Connor flatly rejects this reasoning.'" In
controversies involving incomplete diversity of citizenship, there is no possibility of
forum shopping, as there is no access to federal courts." And, in controversies with
complete diversity, the FAA grants both parties access to the federal courts." The
result is that no party can gain any advantage through forum shopping."
146. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 18.
147. See id.
148. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
149. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 23.
150. See id.
151. See id.; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
152. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 24.
153. See id at 30.
154. See id
155. See id.
156. See id at 33-34.






B. The Application of the FAA in the Employment Context: Gilmer v.
InterstateJohnson Lane Corp.
The employment context is another area in which the Court has applied the FAA.
Section I of the FAA states, "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." "6 Thus, a fair reading of Section 1 would
indicate that Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to employment contracts.
Indeed, the chairman of the ABA committee that drafted the Act stated before
Congress, that the bill "is not intended to be an act referring to labor disputes, at
all."' However, in another curious line of cases, the Supreme Court expanded the
FAA to cover contracts that Congress explicitly stated the Act would not encom-
pass - contracts of employment.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.," the Supreme Court held that an
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration under the FAA. In Gilmer, Petitioner brought suit against
his employer alleging that his termination was in violation of the ADEA. His
employer sought to compel arbitration of the ADEA claims on the basis of an
agreement to arbitrate in Gilmer's registration application with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). This registration application contained a clause that provided for
arbitration of any controversy arising out of a registered representative's employment
or termination of employment."6 Gilmer challenged the motion on three grounds.
First, Gilmer contended that statutory claims should not be subject to arbitration, as
these procedures frustrate the intent of the ADEA. Second, the NYSE arbitration
proceedings are inadequate to provide the relief sought by Gilmer. Third, Gilmer
claimed that the arbitration agreement was the product of unequal bargaining power
between himself and his employer.
In deciding whether the ADEA claims are covered by the FAA, the Gilmer Court
looked to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."s The
Mitsubishi Court ruled that statutory claims may be submitted to binding arbitration
if they are part of a bargained for contract."a The Gilmer Court affirmed the
Mitsubishi holding, noting that because Gilmer made the bargain to arbitrate, he
should be held to it, unless the ADEA explicitly precludes the arbitration of ADEA
claims." With regard to Gilmer's attack on the adequacy of arbitration
proceedings provided for by the NYSE, the Court quickly disposed of this
argument."a Gilmer contended that the limited discovery allowed in arbitration
proceedings would make it difficult to prove discrimination. The Court rejected this
160. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1994).
161. Hearing, supra note 97, at 39-40.
162. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
163. See id. at 20.
164. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
165. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
166. See Gilner, 500 U.S. at 26.
167. See id at21.
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reasoning, noting that Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
and Sherman Antitrust claims are surely as complex as ADEA claims."6 And, the
Mitsubishi Court held that RICO and Sherman Antitrust claims can be subject to
binding arbitration."
Next, Gilmer claimed that the development of the law will be stifled because the
arbitrators do not issue written opinions.' Gilmer argued this would result in a
lack of public knowledge about discriminatory practices.' However, the Gilmer
Court emphasized that the NYSE rules require written opinions of the arbitrators,
which are available to the public.m  The Court emphasized that it will not
speculate as to the competency of arbitration panels, when both the FAA and the
NYSE rules protect against biased panels.m
Finally, Gilmer contended that an arbitration panel does not have the power to
fashion equitable relief, a common remedy of discrimination claims. 74 In rejecting
this argument, the Court stated that NYSE rules do not restrict the type of relief that
may be awarded by an arbitrator. Additionally, the Court noted that arbitration
agreements do not preclude the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) itself from seeking class-wide and equitable relief.'" The Court's
reasoning with respect to the adequacy of and public accessibility to arbitration
awards makes sense; however, the Court's statement that the EEOC can seek
equitable relief raises an important question. What about private class action suits?
The holding in Gilmer closes the door on the possibility of a class-action suit;
instead, the parties are forced to submit to arbitration and then hope that the EEOC
chooses to seek equitable relief.
Gilmer claimed that he had no choice but to agree to the arbitration clause,
because the arbitration agreement was a part of the requisite application for
membership with the NYSE.'76 The Gilmer Court, without examining the merits
of Gilmer's claim of inequality, stated simply that mere inequality of bargaining
power is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context.'
In choosing to apply the FAA to the employment contract, the Court completely
disregards both the unambiguous language of section 1 of the FAA and the
legislative history of the FAA. Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that the
arbitration clauses contained in employment agreements are specifically exempt
from coverage of the FAA.7" The majority declined to address this issue in
168. See id.
169. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 615.





175. See id. at 22.
176. See id at 32.
177. See i. at 33.




Gilmer, noting that Gilmer failed to raise this issue on appeal." However, the
Court has reviewed waived issues sua sponte on many occasions." In fact, in the
same Term in which the Court decided Gilmer, the Court decided other cases on
grounds not argued in any of the courts below or in petitions for certiorari.' In
Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., the Court decided the case on issues not raised in
proceedings below."8 Justice Stevens stated that the considerations in favor of
reaching an issue not presented below are more compelling in Gilmer, than in the
cases noted.'" In fact, the issue of the applicability was raised by the amici in
support of Gilmer." Thus, in following precedent cited in support of his conten-
tions, Justice Stevens noted that the question of whether the FAA is applicable in
employment disputes is clearly antecedent and ultimately dispositive of the Gilmer
case."6 Common sense tells us that deciding whether the FAA extends to
employment contracts is clearly the first step in deciding how to apply the FAA in
employment contracts.
The majority, in dicta, stated that the arbitration agreement was not part of an
employment agreement, as the clause was included in the application for member-
ship with the NYSE. However, this circumvention of the language of the FAA fails
to recognize the spirit of section 1 of the FAA. The authors of the FAA intended
labor disputes to be outside the scope of the FAA. In the Senate hearing before the
passage of the original FAA, Senator Walsh stated that terms in contracts for
employment are often offered on a take it or leave it basis." Clearly, the authors
of the bill did not intend employment disputes to be within the scope of the FAA,
and the judicial expansion of the Act does not comport with the intentions of the
drafters of the Act. Even if, as here, the arbitration clause was not a part of the
employment agreement, the arbitration clause was part of a requisite application for
membership into another body.
Thus, the Court's interpretation of the scope of the FAA would allow an employer
to condition employment upon an employee's assent to arbitrate employment
disputes in an agreement that is not actually an employment agreement. This would
have the effect of allowing employers to avoid statutory prohibition of these
arbitration provisions in the employment context. Justice Stevens points to several
Circuit Court of Appeals cases in which the courts decided that the FAA's
employment contract exclusion provision referred not only to individual employment
contracts, but also to collective bargaining agreements." Collective bargaining
179. See id. at 25.
180. See id. at 37.
181. See id.
182. 498 U.S. 73 (1990).
183. See id at 77; see also McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (in which the Court decided a
case on a question which it did not appear that the party had anticipated).
184. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39.
185. See id
186. See id.
187. See Hearing, supra note 97, at 9.
188. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40; see also Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th
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agreements, like the NYSE membership application, are not technically contracts for
employment, yet these courts have applied the FAA to exclude these
agreements."w Although the Supreme Court enforced the arbitration clauses in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills' ° by noting the references to the Labor
Management Relations Act contained within the collective bargaining agreements,
the Court refused to overrule the decisions of the Courts of Appeals."' In his
Lincoln Mills dissent, Justice Frankfurter saw an implicit rejection of the availability
of the FAA in collective bargaining agreements."n Justice Frankfurter inferred this
rejection from the Court's silent treatment given to the FAA in the Lincoln Mills
majority opinion. His reading of the FAA is that when Congress passed legislation
to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by the federal courts, it saw fit to
exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts.'
Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the purpose of the ADEA is frustrated by
compulsory arbitration of employment discrimination claims. "' In support of this
contention, Justice Stevens stated that the court's power to issue broad injunctive
relief is the cornerstone of eliminating discrimination in society. 9" It is plain to
see that the purpose of the ADEA, and similar legislation, is to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace. Therefore, by refusing to let parties seek class-
based relief in the courts in favor of compulsory arbitration of claims on an
individual basis, the Court's holding in Gilmer clearly cripples the Court's quest for
equality. The strongest argument in favor of excluding employment disputes from
the scope of the FAA is the simplest. Section 1 of the FAA explicitly excludes
contracts for employment from coverage of the Act.' Absent any congressional
intent to the contrary, the language of the FAA should be given a fair reading, and
not be the subject of judicial revision.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to compel arbitration of
an employment dispute in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co." In Duffield, a
securities dealer sued her employer, alleging breach of contract, sexual
discrimination, and sexual harassment under Title VII and California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act. Further, the plaintiff sought a declaration that
securities industry employees could not be compelled to arbitrate employment
disputes.' The issue before the court was whether employers may require that all
Cir. 1956); United Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1954); Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Elec. R. & Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951).
189. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 41.
190. 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
191. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40.
192. See id.; see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 466.
193. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 41.
194. See id. at 42.
195. See id.; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
196. 9 U.S.C.A. § I (West 1994).





employees waive their right to adjudicate Title VII and other statutory and
nonstatutory claims in favor of arbitration as a condition of employment."9
The Duffield court held that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may
not compel employees to waive their right to a judicial forum as a condition
precedent to employment.' After discussing the evolution of arbitration of
employment disputes, the Duffield court reasoned that in passing Title VII, Congress
manifested its belief that arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the
transcendent public interest in the enforcement of Title VII. ' However, the court
noted that after Gilmer, if courts are to hold that an act precludes arbitration of
claims to which it gives rise, more than the mere mentioning of the right to a jury
trial in the statute is required to preclude arbitration.' The court stated that in
order for a statute to be interpreted as precluding arbitration of its claims, courts
must inquire into the congressional intent surrounding the particular legislation.'
In Duffield, the court reasoned that the language of Title VII reveals Congress's
intent to preclude Title VII claims from compulsory arbitration. By enacting The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which encourages arbitration "where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law," Congress intended to codify its position that
compulsory arbitration was not authorized by law, and that compelling employees
to forego their rights to litigate Title VII claims was not appropriate.' This means
that the FAA does not make arbitration clauses in many employment contexts valid
as a matter of law. Courts may look at a particular statute to determine whether
Congress intended for statutory claims to be arbitrable. Although this holding does
not conclusively state the intent of the drafters of the FAA, it is a step toward the
proper interpretation of the FAA.
IV. Arbitration in Oklahoma Courts
Oklahoma courts take a vastly different view regarding the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. In 1996, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the
separability doctrine in Shaffer v. Jeffery. The plaintiffs in Shaffer were six
couples who each sought to adopt a child.' Hoping to find children to adopt, the
plaintiffs entered into contracts with the defendant who promised to find prospective
adoptees for the couples.' Each contract with the defendant contained an
arbitration clause. The defendant, an attorney, collected fees from the prospec-
tive parents, but breached the contract by failing to locate children for the couples
199. See id. at 1185.
200. See id. at 1199.
201. See id. at 1188.
202. See i at 1190.
203. See id. at 1193.
204. See id.
205. IM. at 1194.
206. 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996).




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
to adopt2 1 In fact, the defendant provided the would-be parents with fictitious
pregnancy status reports and promises from non-existent mothers. When it
became evident to the plaintiffs that there were no children to adopt, the plaintiffs
filed suit in state courtL. The plaintiffs sought rescission of the fee agreements,
damages for breach of contract, conversion, the tort of outrage, fraud, and legal
malpractice."'
The defendant successfully moved the trial court to dismiss the claims against
him because the attorney-client contract contained a clause that future disputes
would be decided by arbitration."4 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed
the trial court's motion, and entered orders compelling arbitration. The issue before
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a showing of fraud in the inducement
of the attorney-client contract defeated the enforcement of the arbitration clause in
the contract." 5 Although this issue is almost identical to the issue in Prima Paint,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court came to a different conclusion regarding the
enforcement of the arbitration agreements."6
Arbitration agreements are statutorily allowed by Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration
Act (OUAA)'" The OUAA is virtually identical to the FAA. Like the FAA, the
OUAA provides that arbitration agreements will be enforced, except on grounds that
exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.21 Recall that the U.S.
Supreme Court views contracts, and their underlying arbitration clauses, as separable
with respect to fraud 9 Thus, if fraud is alleged in federal court, arbitrators must
resolve the question of whether the contract is valid.' However, if fraud is
alleged in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, federal courts will
determine that question first, before deciding whether or not to compel arbitration.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court does not share this view, however. The Shaffer court
explicitly stated that an allegation of fraud in the inducement of a contract generally
is an issue for the courts to decide."
The gravamen of Shaffer was whether Oklahoma courts should give the OUAA
the same construction as given to the FAA by the Supreme Court in Prima
Paint.' The Shaffer court noted that courts in Louisiana, Minnesota, and
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Shaffer pointed to Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint for guidancem  As
mentioned previously in Prima Paint, Justice Black dissented from the majority and
expressed the view that if the contract was procured by fraud, there is no contract
and, subsequently, nothing to arbitrate.' Additionally, Justice Black stated that
courts have far more expertise resolving legal issues that go to the validity of a
contract than do arbitrators' 5 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with this
rationale, and rejected the separability doctrine in George Engine Co. 27 The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the separability doctrine by concluding that, as
a matter of state contract law, an arbitration agreement cannot be severed from other
contractual provisions contained in a contract' m The Shaffer court stated that the
Minnesota, Louisiana, and Tennessee approaches made more sense than Prima
Paint's separability doctrine.' This view is clearly the minority view in the
United States and has been criticized by commentators. Although the decision
in Shaffer could be viewed as anti-arbitration, the Shaffer court carefully pointed out
that requiring state courts to resolve questions of fraud by those best suited to
perform the task will only enhance the process of dispute resolution.
The Shaffer holding simply means that in Oklahoma courts if a party alleges
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause or the contract containing the
clause, that agreement is voidable by the party alleging fraud, if that party can prove
fraud."3 It is important here to point out that even in Oklahoma, if a contract
involves interstate commerce, a court is forced to apply the principles of the
separability doctrine from Prima Paint and Southland. This inconsistency is
precisely the reason for legislative revision of the FAA. Absent clear congressional
guidance, the interpretation of the FAA will be subject to change, depending upon
the makeup of the Supreme Court. This judicial legislation appears inconsistent with
the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
V. Analysis
The U.S. Congress intended the FAA to be a procedure applied by the federal
courts, not a basis for the implementation of federal substantive law in diversity
cases involving commerce. Thus, the Lawrence decision and the majority decision
in Prima Paint resulted in a redrafting of the FAA of 1925. The U.S. Constitution
places the lawmaking power clearly within the province of Congress; however, by
stating that the language of the statute advocates the separability doctrine, the Court
avoids problems with constitutionality.
of Blaine v. Hayes & Assoc., Inc., 818 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
224. See Shaffer, 910 P.2d at 916.
225. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395, 412 (1967).
226. See id.
227. See George Engine Co., 350 So. 2d at 881.
228. See Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972).
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Under the current application of the FAA, the Court has frustrated the intent of
the drafters of the original USAL. This interpretation of the FAA has resulted in its
application in a variety of contexts that Congress did not foresee. First, arbitration
agreements are now actually on better footing than other contracts. This is
evidenced by the Court's treatment of arbitration agreements in the fraud context.
Second, under the current application of the FAA, complex questions of law are
now left in the hands of arbitrators who, in many cases, are nonlawyers, and are not
bound to apply the law. Finally, the FAA is now applied to contracts for
employment and statutory claims, two contexts that the drafters of the FAA
excluded from the scope of the FAA, yet the courts have included in their
interpretation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court has now made arbitration provisions stronger than other
contractual provisions. The Prima Paint Court held that a claim of fraud in
inducement of the entire contract was for arbitrators to decide under an arbitration
clause contained within the contractO2 As Justice Black stated in his dissent from
Prima Paint, the avowed purpose of the Act was to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts. 3 The Prima Paint holding creates a
situation in which arbitration agreements are upheld in situations where a court
would likely void the entire contract due to a finding of fraud in the inducement of
the contract. Basically, the Prima Paint Court ruled that in federal court, the only
way for a party to challenge the validity of a contract containing an arbitration
clause would be to allege fraud in the inducement of the arbitration provision itself.
This includes situations such as those in Prima Paint, where a party claims that it
would not have entered any agreement with another party, but for the fraudulent
claims and promises of that party. Thus, an arbitration provision in a contract is
specifically enforced by the court, despite the fact that an arbitrator may later find
that the entire contract is void.
The result is that parties are allowed to seek rescission of certain contractual
provisions while other provisions, such as arbitration agreements, are given full
validity. Without clearly saying so, the Court has made arbitration agreements
nonrescindable, unless a party alleges fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
agreement. In Prima Paint, would the Court have upheld the covenant not to
compete and not enforce the sales agreement because Prima Paint did not allege
fraud in the inducement of the sales agreement? Although we can never know for
sure, it is safe to assume that had the Court found fraud in the inducement of the
entire contract, the Prima Paint Court would have voided the entire contract, not
just certain provisions. However, the result of the Prima Paint doctrine is that
courts now enforce "tidbits" of a contract. The problem with this view is that courts
are losing sight of what arbitration agreements really represent. Certainly, an
arbitration agreement is a form of a forum-selection clause, and, considering the fact
that many courts' dockets are continually full, it is wise to seek an expeditious
dispute resolution forum for certain situations.
232. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).




Arbitration clauses are contractual provisions that should be governed by the
same rules and doctrines as other contractual provisions. If a party alleges fraud in
the inducement of a contract, individual provisions of that contract should not be
enforced until the court resolves the question of fraud.
The next problem with the Court's reading of the FAA is that complex questions
of law are now left to arbitrators. In many situations, arbitrators are not trained in
the law, and, furthermore, arbitrators are not bound to follow the law. Thus, courts
now compel parties to submit their claims to arbitrators who are not qualified to
decide complicated issues of substantive law. This is simply not what the drafters
of the FAA intended. The authors of the Act stated that arbitration is particularly
suited to the disposition of questions of fact, such as quantity, quality, time of
delivery, etc.' From these statements, it is safe to infer that the drafters of the
FAA intended questions of law to be decided by the courts, and questions of fact
to be decided by arbitrators. This interpretation seems closer to Congress's original
intent. Additionally, this view would result in a lighter case load for many courts.
Yet, after Prima Paint, any question, whether law or fact, is to be decided by
arbitrators if a contract contains an agreement to arbitrate. Thus, the Court would
force a party to submit their question of a contract's validity to a dispute resolution
body, rather than decide the claim itself. This is simply unjust. If a party willingly
submits to arbitration, then he has willfully taken the risk that an arbitrator will not
render a decision completely in line with substantive law. However, denying a party
his right to a jury trial, and then forcing him to arbitrate his claims in a forum not
bound, or unqualified, to apply the law may very well deny a party's right to due
process of law. 5
Last, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA results in the FAA's
application in cases that the drafters of the Act never intended. First, the Court's
decision in Gilmer expands the coverage of the FAA to employment contracts, an
area expressly excluded from coverage by Congress.' Section 1 of the FAA
reads, "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."' Despite this language, the Gilmer Court held that the FAA applies
to contracts for employment, and forced the petitioner to submit his discrimination
claims to arbitration.' The result of this holding is that employers are now able
to force employees to assent to arbitration provisions as a prerequisite to
employment. Thus, employees who sign contracts containing agreements to arbitrate
lose their right to bring suit against their employers in court. Again, this application
of the FAA raises serious questions about due process. For, if individuals are not
allowed to exercise their right of access to the courts, these individuals are denied
their Constitutional right of due process.
234. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 26, at 155.
235. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 408.
236. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
237. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1994).
238. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
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Another context in which the Court has applied the FAA is statutorily created
causes of action. These include discrimination and class action claims. As we saw
in both Gilmer and Southland, the Court has decided that these areas of law are
covered by the FAA. The result is that courts apply USAL to issues of law that did
not even exist at the time of its enactment. The problem is that arbitrators simply
do not have the power to issue the proper remedy in these situations. Arbitrators do
not have the power to issue broad injunctive relief to an aggrieved party. Broad
injunctive relief is necessary to eliminate discrimination, and the power to issue
class-wide relief is essential to the adjudication of class action claims. Arbitrators
do not have the authority that the courts enjoy to fashion equitable remedies.
Additionally, compulsory arbitration within the context of statutory rights
conflicts with the congressional purpose in creating such rights. When Congress
enacts a law that creates a cause of action for individuals within a protected class,
it gives individuals the right to sue where they otherwise would not have the right.
Thus, applying the FAA to these situations practically vitiates the statutorily created
cause of action. In effect, parties are allowed to force a waiver of an individual's
right to trial by placing an arbitration clause in a contract. This interpretation of the
FAA is not consistent with the original intent of the drafters of the FAA. Finally,
when a party seeks equitable relief, such as one compelling arbitration, equity
requires the party to come before the court with clean hands. In the aforementioned
situations, this ancient equity doctrine is ignored, because if a party fraudulently
induces a contract, or forces a waiver of rights through compulsory arbitration, then
that party seeking arbitration does not have clean hands.
VI. Suggested Revisions of the FAA
As the preceding cases illustrate, the U.S. Supreme Court has greatly expanded
the FAA. This expansion has resulted in confusion and uncertainty. In response to
the Court's expansion of the FAA, what action should Congress take now? As the
United States enters the next century, it is time for Congress to revise the FAA in
order to ensure that the FAA is applied in a manner consistent with the drafters'
original intent. The drafters of the FAA sought to create legislation that would
declare the validity of arbitration agreements in federal courts. This is not to say
that the original intent of drafters of the Act was to make arbitration agreements
summarily valid under any circumstance.
In fact, federal judges were to enter an order compelling arbitration, provided that
no questions arose as to the validity of the arbitration agreement." Further, the
drafters sought to create a procedure whereby courts would consider questions of
validity of arbitration agreements first, then the courts would decide whether to
compel arbitration.' For whatever reason, the Supreme Court has ignored the
original intent of the FAA. This is not due to a vaguely written statute; the fact is
that courts simply like arbitration. Judges would rather see a case go to arbitration





than fit the case into their overcrowded docket. Indeed, arbitration in many cases
is more expedient and less costly than litigation. In certain situations, arbitration
makes sense for simple factual disputes. However, nowhere in the legislative history
of the Act do the drafters of the FAA indicate that they desired an arbitration law
as inclusive as the FAA.4 Thus, the time is ripe for congressional revision of the
FAA.
First, individuals who are qualified to decide complicated legal issues should
decide those issues. This means that Congress should limit the types of disputes that
qualify for compelled arbitration. This is not a suggestion that Congress should limit
the scope of the subject matter for willing participants in arbitration. Indeed, the
drafters of the FAA would likely not object to willing participants being allowed to
arbitrate virtually any claim they wished. These suggestions are aimed at situations
in which one party is in breach, and the validity of a contract containing an
arbitration provision is in question. This would include allegations of fraud, duress,
or coercion. By adding a provision such as this, Congress would avoid Prima Paint-
like problems in the future. A potential line of demarcation for deciding whether
or not a claim is arbitrable would be whether the claim is essentially a factual or
legal dispute. For instance, questions regarding the validity of the contract would
be decided by a court, and if that court found the arbitration clause to be legally
valid, the case would be submitted to arbitration. This procedure could be similar
to class certification procedures for class action claims. A party seeking court-
ordered arbitration pursuant to a contract would have to respond to any objections
to the validity of the contract prior to the court compelling the opposing party to
go through arbitration. If the court found that a valid contract exists, the judge
would compel arbitration; if not, the judge would hear the case herself without
arbitration.
Although it may seem that this certification process would allow individuals to
get to court by simply alleging fraud, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure already contains a provision requiring that fraud must be pleaded with
particularity. 2 Parties alleging fraud would have to do more than simply make
allegations, thus assuring that frivolous claims of fraud will not be the basis for
avoiding arbitration. Rule 9 would be read in conjunction with Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows judges to sanction attorneys who
sign false or misleading pleadings.2 Admittedly, this is not a perfect solution, as
many claims involve both complex factual and legal issues. However, this revision
would be the basis for a system in which parties are ensured that their disputes will
be resolved by those individuals who are the most qualified to decide their claims.
Next, Congress should require that arbitration panels follow the law of the forum
state. This provision would simply ensure that claims would be decided according
to the law, and not a layman opinion of how the law is to be interpreted. Again, it
should be pointed out that these suggestions are within the context of compelled
241. See generally id.
242. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
243. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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arbitration, not willing submission to arbitration. Additionally, the FAA should not
be interpreted as a declaration of federal substantive law. Federal decisions should
not infringe upon individual states' power to interpret the law of their respective
states. This suggestion would eliminate the Erie problems that exist under the
current application of the FAA.
Finally, Congress should address the issue of whether statutory rights would be
subject to arbitration. A fair reading of the legislative history would lead many to
conclude that these claims should not be subject to arbitration. Indeed, considering
this problem within the Gilmer-ADEA context, it would seem that arbitrating
statutorily created rights would frustrate the purpose of creating a statute like the
ADEA. When Congress creates a cause of action by statute, it has decided that a
certain protected class needs to have a basis for claims other than those that already
exist. Additionally, these statutes create a right to access the courts for new causes
of action, and by compelling arbitration of these claims, the courts are simply
undercutting the strength of the statutes.
Understandably, these suggestions do not create a perfect system of arbitration.
However, this discussion is important to illustrate ways in which Congress could
curb the judicial expansion of the FAA. This judicial expansion appears vastly
inconsistent with the original intent of the drafters of the original USAL. Therefore,
in order that the intent of the original drafters of the FAA be followed, it is now
time for Congress to revise the FAA.
Todd Baker
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